As reported on November 19, 2026, K3 Capital’s Ethereum-based sBOLD savings vault had been exploited for approximately $3.4 million. The reported drain took place across 97 transactions in about eight minutes. sBOLD is a yield-bearing vault built around BOLD, the stablecoin from Liquity.
What the reported exploit targeted
According to Bitquery’s transaction analysis, the attacker exploited how the vault accounted for the value of assets transferred into it. The reported sequence involved depositing BOLD, introducing wrapped ether (WETH) that was not recorded on the vault’s balance sheet, and converting it internally to BOLD. That raised the apparent redemption value of each sBOLD share, allowing withdrawals at an inflated valuation at other depositors’ expense.

Who captured the funds
Bitquery reported that an automated MEV bot detected the original attacker’s transaction in the mempool, copied and changed its parameters, and moved first. The bot extracted about $1.91 million, or 56.18% of the reported $3.4 million drain. It paid approximately $1.78 million in priority fees to Ethereum block builders, leaving about $130,000 from that portion after those fees.
The report said Titan built most of the blocks containing the bot’s transactions; BuilderNet, Ultrasound and Quasar also participated in ordering related blocks. Researchers cautioned that the $1.78 million was gross revenue to builders, who still had to pay for block proposals through MEV-Boost. The original attacker and an initial funding wallet reportedly ended up with approximately $520,000 in net proceeds.
What remains unresolved
ChainSecurity audited sBOLD in May 2025 and warned of a potential route to extract excess value through self-liquidation. Whether this exploit used that mechanism was still under investigation at the time of the report; the earlier warning does not establish a match.
The report said the team was working with tracking organizations to monitor cross-chain fund movements, assess affected depositors’ losses and repair the vault code. It also identified restrictions on unapproved token transfers, per-block redemption limits and time-weighted oracles as potential safeguards for ERC-4626 vaults—not as measures confirmed to have been deployed for sBOLD.


