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Zodl’s OHTTP Default Separates Wallet Requests From Users’ IP Addresses

As reported on November 11, 2026, Zcash wallet Zodl was rolling out version 3.20.0 with a new default route for wallet-server requests. Its aim is to address a privacy gap that on-chain shielding alone does not close: a light wallet’s server may otherwise see the user’s IP address, what the wallet requests and when it connects. Zodl said the upgrade would reach users in stages over the following days.

How the new route works

Zodl’s design uses Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) to split a request between two operators. The wallet encrypts it for a Zodl gateway, then sends it through a relay operated by Cloudflare or Fastly. The relay can see the user’s IP address but cannot read the request. The gateway decrypts the request and passes it to a Zcash lightwalletd server, but sees the relay’s address rather than the user’s.

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The published code also includes measures intended to make requests harder to distinguish by size and to limit later log matching. Requests are padded in roughly 4 KB increments; transaction broadcasts are padded to at least 16 KB. According to the report, relay request IDs are stored in Zodl’s logs only as HMAC fingerprints made with a key held in gateway memory and lost on restart.

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The trust boundary matters: the separation depends on the relay operator and Zodl not collaborating. A relay can still observe connection times and approximate traffic volume. Zcash community critics also raised concerns about relying on Cloudflare and Fastly, both US companies subject to legal process. Zodl core contributor y4ss acknowledged the limitation, describing OHTTP as a better default rather than a replacement for Tor or Nym against a powerful state-level adversary. Users concerned about pressure on the underlying cloud infrastructure can, y4ss said, enable Zodl’s Tor option on top of OHTTP; the relay would then see a Tor exit IP instead of the user’s address.

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Other approaches, different trade-offs

The report placed Zodl’s change alongside several distinct efforts to protect network metadata:

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  • Nym’s mixnet routes padded traffic through multiple hops and adds decoy traffic to make incoming and outgoing messages harder to match, at the cost of latency. Nym said in September that Zcash wallets Zingo and Zkool had integrated it and that it was in talks with Zodl. It also announced a developer SDK at Devcon 8 the week before the report.
  • Ethereum’s Kohaku and anon-rpc address wallet traffic in different ways. The reported Kohaku command-line tool routes traffic other than local, self-hosted RPC calls through Tor by default. The Ethereum Foundation’s June anon-rpc proposal sought a common interface for wallets to use anonymity networks. A Tor- and Nym-supporting version was reported to be running on mainnet and in use by the Privacy Pools v2 web app.
  • Flashnet, presented by Flashbots in February as research into anonymous Ethereum transaction submission, proposes shared transaction batches and secret-sharing across servers. The report said it had no formal mainnet deployment or published benchmark results at the time.
  • Bitcoin Core 31.0 added an optional private-broadcast feature in April, sending transactions over Tor or I2P with a separate connection for each transaction. Developers later disclosed a fallback flaw that could expose an IP address when an anonymous handshake failed; the report said version 31.1 fixed it.
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These are not interchangeable protections. Zodl’s default limits what either of two service operators can learn alone, while Tor and mixnets take different routes to obscuring network origins. The source also notes a separate infrastructure question: depending on a small number of cloud gateways can create service-denial or concentration risks even when request contents are split from IP addresses. Zodl users can still switch to a community node in advanced settings.